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Will Your Digital Music and E-book Libraries
"Die Hard" With You?: Transferring




If anyone should be concerned about his music collection after death,
Bruce Willis should. The famous action film hero is one "Die Hard stunt-
gone-wrong" from his demise, so it is unsurprising recent tabloids reported
(perhaps falsely) Mr. Willis is concerned about what will happen to his vast
digital music collection (reportedly valued at over $64,000) upon his death.'
True or not, Mr. Willis and the rest of the world's digital purchasers have
every right to be concerned.
Digital music sales soared in 2011. Consumers spent $5.2 billion on
digital music downloads, an 8% increase from 2010.2 iTunes, one of the
world's most popular digital music mediums, led all music retailers in the
second quarter of 2012 with 29 % share of the retail music market.3 Amazon
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ranked second with 16% of the retail music market; Wal-Mart was third with
an 11% market share.4 iTunes now boasts a total of 28 million songs availa-
ble for download, further indicating digital music's foothold on the market.5
In addition to the digitization of music, retailers are increasingly selling
books in digital form. In fact, electronic book (hereinafter "e-book") sales
recently surpassed hardcover sales: "The Association of American Publish-
ers . . . reported that in the first quarter of 2012, adult e-book sales were up to
$282.3 million while adult hardcover sales came to only $229.6 million."6
This finding was up from the first quarter of 2011, when hardcover sales
totaled $223 million, while e-books were $220.4 million.7 Another study
claims that in 2012, the number of e-book users grew from 16% to 23% of all
Americans sixteen and older.8 Conversely, in 2012 the population percentage
of printed book readers decreased from 72% to 67%.9 In line with the in-
crease in e-book reading is the growth in digital reader ownership, such as
the tablet computer, Kindle, or Nook.o Specifically, the ownership of such
devices "grew from 18% [of the population sixteen and older], in late 2011 to
33% in late 2012.""
As music and books become increasingly digitized, they also become
easier to access and store. However, such present convenience could poten-
tially cause future trouble since it seems unlikely that Bruce Willis, or any
other user, actually owns the files in their digital music or e-book libraries.12
That is right; it may be that no one truly owns any of the songs purchased
Pandora's Footprint Soars [STUDY], HYPEBOT (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www
.hypebot.com/hypebot/2012/09/itunes-dominates-music-sales-while-pandoras-
footprint-soars-study.html.
4. NPD GROUP, supra note 3.
5. Paul Resnikoff, Drowning? The iTunes Store Now Has 28 Million Songs ... ,
DIGITAL Music NEWS (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/
permalink/2012/120425itunes.
6. Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, It's the End of Books as You Knew Them: E-Books
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12. Ed Bott, Who Owns Your Digital Downloads? (Hint: It's Not You), ZDNET
(Jan. 3, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/bott/who-owns-your-digi
tal-downloads-hint-its-not-you/283 1.
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through iTunes, or any of the books downloaded on a Kindle.13 The truth is,
when a digital purchase is made-such as an iTunes song or an e-book-
often only a license to access these works is transferred from the seller, rather
than ownership of the copies themselves.14 This license comes with limited
rights and is usually non-transferable.15 Specifically, companies like Apple
control how customers access and disperse digital media through a combina-
tion of copyright law, contract law, and technology.16
Attempts have been made to reconcile traditional copyright, property,
and contract law with the ever-growing and evolving world of digital prop-
erty; but none of the proposed solutions to the dilemma of transferring digital
assets upon death have adequately addressed digital purchases such as e-
books or digital music downloads.'7 As it currently stands, there are no legal
remedies allowing transfer of these valuable digital assets to a decedent's
heirs. 18
However, the development of new technologies may make the transfer
of digital purchases less offensive to copyright holders and lawmakers.19 Re-
gardless, digital ownership issues will become more prevalent as society fur-
ther progresses in the digital era, and more pressing as more digital property
owners pass and leave their digital property behind.20
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
Assets are becoming less tangible as society further immerses itself in
the world of the Internet. 21 Not long ago, when a person died their treasured
13. Id. But cf Adrienne Clare Barbour, Comment, Used iTunes: The Legality of
Redigi's Model for A Second-Hand Digital Music Store, 15 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 165, 195 (2012) (contending that because iTunes' Terms of Sale
do not use language indicating that the purchaser is obtaining a license in the
section regarding music downloads, that users do, in fact own their copy of the
downloaded music file).
14. Bott, supra note 12.
15. Id.
16. Eric Matthew Hinkes, Access Controls in the Digital Era and the Fair Use/
First Sale Doctrines, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 685, 687
(2007).
17. Quentin Fottrell, Who Inherits Your iTunes Library?, MARKET WATCH (Aug.
23, 2012, 4:57 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/who-inherits-your-
itunes-library-2012-08-23?pagenumber-2.
18. Id.
19. Barbour, supra note 13, at 170.
20. Molly Wilkens, Privacy and Security During Life, Access After Death: Are
They Mutually Exclusive?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1037, 1041 (2011).
21. See James D. Lamm, To My Son, I Leave All My Passwords, TRUSTS & Es-
TATES MAGAZINE (July 2009), available at http://www.gpmlaw.com/
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books and music collections were passed to their heirs through will or by
intestacy laws.22 In fact, my immediate family and I own several books and
records left to us by our grandparents. I remember my grandmother's library
fondly. Not only did those musty pieces of paper mean the world to her, but
it was also very important to her that we receive them upon her passing.
When I contemplate what I will have to leave to my children someday, I
consider my Kindle, iBooks, and iTunes libraries. Will my children have the
opportunity to scan through my copy of Wuthering Heights, or The Great
Gatsby (two of my favorites), and see my digital highlights and notes? Or
will they be able to or put on my Christmas playlist as they decorate the
Christmas tree with their families? The most important things in a person's
life are no longer exclusively physical property in the tangible sense. How-
ever, the inability to touch these items does not make them any less valuable.
The growth in digital property can likely be attributed, in large part, to
the growth in Internet use. While young people are the largest demographic
of Internet users, "the biggest increase in Internet use since 2005 has been in
the seventy- to seventy-five-year-old age group."23 For these reasons, more
people are beginning to die with a great deal of intangible, digital property.24
The law must evolve to properly protect those assets.
A. Digital Assets and the "Digital Asset Dilemma"25
Digital assets are not limited to e-books and digital music downloads.
There are several categories of digital assets, including: digital photographs
and videos kept on storage websites; digital photographs on photo sharing
sites such as Flickr and Shutterfly; personal information, such as medical
records or tax information, on "protected" websites; digital information on
social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter; blogs; e-mail ac-
counts; personal and business websites; information from online bank and
uploadedFiles/Resources/Articles/To MySonILeaveAllMyPasswords
.pdf; Kathryn Zickuhr & Mary Madden, Older Adults and Internet Use, PEW
INTERNET (June 6, 2012), http://www.pewintemet.org/Reports/2012/Older-
adults-and-internet-use.aspx (reporting statistics of increased internet usage
among older adults).
22. Wilkens, supra note 20, at 1041.
23. Id. at 1055.
24. Id. at 1041.
25. See Michael D. Roy, Note, Beyond the Digital Asset Dilemma: Will Online
Services Revolutionize Estate Planning?, 24 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 376, 378
n.7 (2011) (defining the "Digital Asset Dilemma" as "the difficulty that users
of online service have in trying to ensure that the contents of their online
accounts are passed to heirs").
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brokerage accounts; and online billing and bill-pay services.26 The conglom-
eration of problems associated with the transfer of these digital assets upon
death has been deemed the "Digital Asset Dilemma."27
Recent cases have illustrated some of the problems associated with the
transfer of digital property after death. For example, after a roadside bomb in
Fallujah killed Justin Ellsworth, a United States Marine, his parents sought
access to his e-mail account in order to create a memorial scrapbook in his
honor.28 Yahoo! complied with the request, but only after a Michigan probate
court issued an order.29 Similarly, after twenty-one-year-old Benjamin Stas-
sen committed suicide without leaving a note, his parents hoped to find an-
swers about their son's death through his Facebook profile and Gmail
account.30 Instead, the Stassens found themselves in conflict with Facebook
and Google, which both denied the Stassens access to their son's accounts. 31
They also were forced to obtain a court order for the release of their son's
online assets; even then, Facebook still postponed the release of access to
Benjamin's account. 32 While these cases deal with e-mail and social media
accounts, they are also illustrative of a few problems potential heirs and pro-
bate attorneys may encounter when dealing with other digital assets such as
digital music and e-book downloads.
In addition to problems heirs face when decedents leave behind digital
assets, the privacy concerns of the deceased still exist.33 If decedents do not
adequately plan for the transfer of digital assets, issues such as identity theft
or their digital assets falling into the wrong hands may arise.34 These
problems frequently occur because many people have numerous online ac-
counts with different usernames and passwords, and it is likely that only the
26. Frank S. Baldino, Estate Planning and Administration for Digital Assets, 45
MD. B.J. 28, 28-29 (2012); Naomi Cahn, Postmortem Life On-Line, 25 PROB.
& PROP. 36, 36-37, (2011).
27. Roy, supra note 25.
28. Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, Who Owns A Decedent's E-Mails:
Inheritable Probate Assets or Property of the Network?, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. PoL'v 281, 282 (2007).
29. Id.
30. Jessica Hopper, Digital Afterlife: What Happens to Your Online Accounts





33. Tyler G. Tamey, A Call for Legislation to Permit the Transfer of Digital Assets
at Death, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 773, 782-83 (2012).
34. Id.; John Conner, Comment, Digital Life After Death: The Issue of Planning
for a Person's Digital Assets After Death, 3 EsT. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP.
L.J. 301, 321 (2011).
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user knows these accounts exist.35 This means these accounts containing val-
uable private information-social security numbers and countless other
pieces of personal material-are potentially left open and unmonitored upon
the death of the user.36 Considering the rampant identity theft plaguing soci-
ety, it is critical to address the protection of these important digital assets. 37
Specifically, the Federal Trade Commission reported that up to nine million
people fall victim to online identity theft yearly.38 Illustratively, 70% of indi-
viduals whose bank accounts were compromised by identity theft partici-
pated in online banking transactions. 39 These numbers illuminate the need to
protect personal accounts, especially after death, when accounts are likely to
go unmonitored.40
Identity theft is not the only privacy concern facing those who die leav-
ing behind digital assets. For example, a user may have opened an account
with an expectation of privacy and may want to keep certain communications
private, even after death.41 Similarly, a legal safety net is needed to ensure
that particular family members, or business associates, do not gain access to
potentially hurtful or harmful online information from a decedent's estate.42
An examination of how some companies handle their customers' deaths
further highlights the obstacles created by the "Digital Asset Dilemma." For
instance, Facebook "memorializes" a deceased user's account by freezing it
and preventing all but previously confirmed friends from posting comments
on the decedent's profile page in their "remembrance."43 Furthermore,
Facebook only considers turning over content of a deceased person's account
to an "authorized representative" after a "lengthy process" that requires a
court order.44 Similarly, Yahoo!'s Terms of Service expressly rejects the
right of survivorship for its users' accounts and will only provide e-mails to
35. Conner, supra note 34, at 321.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Gerry W. Beyer & Naomi Cahn, When You Pass on, Don't Leave the Pass-
words Behind: Planning for Digital Assets, 26 PROB. & PROP. 40, 40-41
(2012).
39. Wilkens, supra note 20, at 1039.
40. Conner, supra note 34, at 321.
41. Tarney, supra note 33, at 782-83.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 781; Cahn, supra note 26, at 37. See Deactivating, Deleting & Memorial-
izing Accounts, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/3590462441663
95/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2013).
44. Tarney, supra note 33, at 781; Baldino, supra note 26, at 30; Cahn, supra note
26, at 37; Deactivating, Deleting & Memorializing Accounts, supra note 43.
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decedents' heirs upon a court order.45 The company will also deactivate and
permanently delete the content of the account upon request of survivors, but
it does not give the survivors the option to access the account or data.46 Like-
wise, Google's licensing agreement fails to provide any clear indication of
what happens to a user's account upon death and does not allow the transfer
of the account or any data.47 However, Gmail's "Help" page reads, "in rare
cases we may be able to provide the contents of the Gmail account to an
authorized representative of the deceased person," and further explains the
complex procedure for obtaining such access that, notably, also requires a
federal court order.48 With respect to digital music and e-book libraries spe-
cifically, Amazon's Terms of Use states users "do not acquire any ownership
rights in the software or music content," and "Apple limits the use of digital
files to Apple devices used by the account holder."49 Moreover, the most
prominent e-book and digital music companies have not yet published a clear
policy to govern their licensing agreements with users.
B. Proposed Solutions to the "Digital Asset Dilemma"
Companies have created problems by limiting the transfer of users' digi-
tal assets after death.50 Scholars and entrepreneurs have proposed several so-
lutions to these problems.51 One of these proposed solutions is the use of
software or a website to store usernames and passwords, along with other
information, the user wants transferred to a beneficiary at the user's death.52
These types of services are frequently referred to as Digital Estate Planning
45. Tarney, supra note 33, at 780; Yahoo! Terms of Service, YAHOO! (Mar. 16,
2012), http://info.yahoo.com/legal /us/yahoo/utos/utos-173.html.
46. Tarney, supra note 33, at 780 n.56; Yahoo! Terms of Service, supra note 45.
47. Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE (Mar. 1, 2012), https://www.google.com/
intl/en/policies/terms/.
48. Accessing a Deceased Person's Mail, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/
mail/answer/14300?hl=en#l (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
49. Fottrell, supra note 17. See Amazon MP3 Store: Terms of Use, AMAZON (Jan.
10, 2013), http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeld=20
0154280&#content; iTunes Store Terms and Conditions, APPLE (Dec. 3, 2012),
http://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/us/terms.html.
50. Fottrell, supra note 17. See, e.g., Amazon MP3 Store Terms of Use, AMAZON
(Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?node
Id=200154280 (providing an example of a company that disallows transfer of
digital assets); iTunes Store Terms and Conditions, APPLE (Dec. 3, 2012), http:/
/www.apple.comlegal/itunes/us/terms.html (providing an example of a com-
pany that disallows transfer of digital assets).
51. See Noam Kutler, Note, Protecting Your Online You: A New Approach to Han-
dling Your Online Persona After Death, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1641, 1649
(2011); see also Fottrell, supra note 17.
52. Roy, supra note 25, at 388.
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(DEP) services.53 DEP services include "any services capable of passing in-
formation from a decedent to another after a decedent's death, including ser-
vices that deliver posthumous e-mails."54 For instance, there are several
software and web-based services for the storage and management of pass-
words, such as KeePass, IPassword, Roboform, LastPass, Password Safe,
Clipperz, and PassPack.55 These services provide one place to store all of a
person's passwords in order to provide heir's access to important digital as-
sets after death.56 Additionally, new internet-based services now exist that
give a user places specifically for leaving a list of accounts, passwords, loca-
tions of key documents, final wishes, and messages to family and friends
upon death or incapacity.57 Among the most popular of these sites are As-
setLock, Legacy Locker, and Deathswitch.58 AssetLock serves as an "online
safe deposit box" where individuals can store letters, notes, important docu-
ments, and secret account information, which the websites release to pre-
designated persons after a minimum number of people have confirmed the
user's death.59 Legacy Locker is a very similar website, but is limited to
storing important online account information that can be assigned and re-
leased to different beneficiaries.60 Deathswitch is a slightly different con-
cept. 61 The program prompts a user for a password on a regular schedule and
after the user fails to respond a certain number of times, the automated sys-
tem "deduces that [the user is] dead or critically disabled" and then sends
prewritten e-mails to the designated beneficiaries.62
While DEP services may provide solid practical solutions that ensure
the appropriate people receive access to critical information after a user's
death, the physical ability and the legal right to access digital assets are "two
completely different things."63 Users likely violate the terms of service and
user agreements signed with various online companies by providing
53. See id. at 377.
54. Id. at 377 n.6.
55. Lamm, supra note 21, at 2.
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. Id.; Gerry W. Beyer & Kerri G. Nipp, Estate Planning for Digital Assets, Es-
TATE PLANNING DEVELOPMENTS FOR TEXAS PROFESSIONALS (Mar. 8, 2011),
available at http://ssm.com /abstract=1781483.
59. Beyer & Nipp, supra note 58, at 6.
60. See id.; Your Legacy Locker, LEGACY LOCKER, http://www.legacylocker.com/
features/locker (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
61. See What is a Deathswitch?, DEATH SWITCH, www.deathswitch.com (last vis-
ited Oct. 9, 2013).
62. Id.; see also Beyer & Nipp, supra note 56.
63. Fottrell, supra note 17.
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usemames and passwords to their heirs.64 Heirs also likely violate the law
when they try to access these accounts and use the data held within.65 Moreo-
ver, privacy and identity theft remain issues even with DEP services. 66 Most
DEP services require a username and password and use the same security
technology as many other online services.67 However, DEP services are risky
because they contain access information for all of a user's critical accounts.
There is a great deal at stake if a DEP service were to ever fail or be
hacked.68 For this reason, individuals and estate planners should think twice
before using DEP services.
Another proposed solution is to treat digital assets as like tangible prop-
erty and transfer them through traditional probate devices such as wills,
trusts, or intestacy laws.69 However, there are several reasons why transfer-
ring digital assets through probate devices may not be ideal. First, 58% of
Americans do not have a will and, therefore, have very little control over
their assets after death.70 Additionally, even if a will exists, usernames and
passwords change much more often than individuals update their wills. Wills
also become public information during probate proceedings, which can pre-
sent problems when the wills contain private personal information the parties
involved do not want publicized.71 Furthermore, with regards to digital music
downloads and e-books, the licenses for these products likely do not survive
the purchaser's death; thus the purchaser likely does not have the ability to
transfer those purchases through a will. 72
Although trusts may be preferable to wills, the use of trust instruments
can also be problematic.73 In contrast to a will, a trust does not become public
information. 74 Once transferred to a trust, licenses are likely to survive the
user's death, thus preserving the ownership rights for beneficiaries of the
trust.75 To capitalize on the unique benefits of trusts, an individual developed
software that combines password storage and management services, along
64. Tarney, supra note 33, at 778; Laura McKinnon, Planning for the Succession
of Digital Assets, 27 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REV. 362, 366 (2011), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2011.03.002.
65. See Tamey, supra note 33, at 788-90.
66. McKinnon, supra note 61, at 366.
67. See Wilkens, supra note 20, at 1059-60.
68. See id. at 1060.
69. Conner, supra note 34, at 319-20.
70. Wilkens, supra note 20, at 1041.
71. Conner, supra note 34, at 320.
72. See id. at 321.
73. Id. at 320.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 319.
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with instructions to create a legal trust for online accounts. 76 Though there
are several hurdles to transferring digital property through trusts. The trust
must: be updated with changing account information and new accounts; be
created before the user's death; and comply with all formalities required by
state law.77 For these reasons, a trust is not the optimal solution to transfer
digital assets. Unfortunately, intestacy laws are not a better alternative be-
cause they do not protect the privacy rights of decedents, whose account
information would automatically transfer to heirs designated by statute.78
Transfers by intestacy also fail to account for the intent of the decedent;
individuals who opened accounts with expectations of privacy and never
would have wanted the state to distribute such accounts.
A few state legislatures have also tackled the "Digital Asset Di-
lemma."79 Specifically, five states-Rhode Island, Connecticut, Indiana,
Oklahoma, and Idaho-have passed laws allowing heirs to access users' e-
mail and social media sites after death.80 Connecticut and Rhode Island en-
acted statutes that "requir[e] email service providers to provide an executor
or an administrator with access to or copies of the contents of the email
account of its customers."81 However, the legislation in these two states is
limited to e-mails and does not provide for other online accounts or digital
assets. 82 Indiana has enacted a broader statute that require companies elec-
tronically storing information or documents for individuals to "provide to the
personal representative of the estate of a deceased person, who was domi-
ciled in Indiana at the time of the person's death, access to or copies of any
documents or information of the deceased person stored electronically by the
custodian."83 This statute, by its own terms, limits access to "documents or
information," and does not consider the intent of the decedent when giving
the personal representative access to private information.84
Laws in Oklahoma and Idaho are more comprehensive.85 For instance,
the relevant Oklahoma statute states "the executor or administrator of an es-
tate shall have the power, where otherwise authorized, to take control of,
conduct, continue, or terminate any accounts of a deceased person on any
76. See id. at 320.
77. Conner, supra note 34, at 319-20.
78. See id. at 308.
79. Baldino, supra note 26, at 30; Cahn, supra note 26, at 37-38.
80. Baldino, supra note 26, at 30; Cahn, supra note 26, at 38.
81. Baldino, supra note 26, at 30 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-334a (2011) and
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-27-3 (2011)).
82. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-27-3; Cahn, supra note 26, at 38.
83. IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 (2011); Baldino, supra note 26, at 30.
84. See IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1.
85. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-5-424(3)(z) (Supp. 2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 58,
§ 269 (1995 & Supp. 2013); Cahn, supra note 26, at 38.
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social networking website, any microblogging, or short message service web-
site, or any e-mail service websites."86 By its own terms, the Oklahoma stat-
ute limits the right to transfer accounts only to listed individuals, and it gives
the executor or administrator the power to control the accounts "where other-
wise provided."87 The problem with this statute's language is that it does not
appear to bequest any power not already granted by online licensing agree-
ments. Again, this is problematic because digital information websites often
prohibit other persons from entering the account, often terminating any ac-
cess rights at the death of the user.88 Additionally, these websites may argue
Oklahoma law does not govern them.89 This argument could be particularly
effective for those companies whose licensing agreements contain choice of
law clauses and elect to be governed by the laws of another state. 90 Moreo-
ver, no state has enacted a law that adequately provides for the post-death
transfer of one's digital purchases, such as e-books and digital music
downloads.91
C. "Digital Asset Dilemma" Applied to Digital Purchases
While legislatures are taking steps in the right direction toward solving
the "Digital Asset Dilemma," they are forgetting several of the most impor-
tant and, arguably, most valuable assets: digital purchases, such as e-books
and digital music downloads.92 Whether, and how, to transfer these assets
will become more problematic as sales of digital music and e-books continue
to rise.93 The law regarding ownership and transfer of digital purchases, as it
stands, is a conglomeration of murky copyright, contract, and property law.94
Even after wading through the current legal swamp, purchasers and probate
attorneys possess no practical or legal way to transfer these digital assets at
death.95
86. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 269; Baldino, supra note 26, at 30; Cahn, supra note 26,
at 38.
87. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 269.
88. Roy, supra note 25, at 385.
89. Tarney, supra note 33, at 788-89.
90. Id.
91. Andrew Chow, Digital Estate Planning: What to Do About iTunes, eBooks?,
TECHNOLOGIST, (Oct. 18, 2012, 5:48 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/technolo
gist/2012/1 0/digital-estate-planning-what-to-do-about-itunes-ebooks.html.
92. See id.
93. Harlow & Henry, supra note 1.
94. See Roger Yu, Digital Inheritance Laws Remain Murky, USA TODAY (Sept.
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D. "Digital Asset Dilemma" and Copyright Law
Copyright law dictates much of what an individual may do with his or
her copyrighted property.96 Specifically, copyright law gives copyright own-
ers six exclusive rights: (1) reproduction; (2) preparation of derivative works;
(3) distribution; (4) public performance; (5) public display; and (6) digital
audio transmission and performance.97 In order for anyone other than the
copyright owner to exercise any of these rights, they must obtain permission
from the copyright owner.98 These rights may serve as a barrier to individu-
als' ability to transfer their digital purchases. The biggest problem with digi-
tal transfers is that, in order to transfer a digital file, the Random Access
Memory (RAM) of the recipient's computer must create a copy of the trans-
ferred file.99 The RAM copy then remains on the recipient's computer, while
the original file remains intact on the transferor's computer.'oo The making of
such a copy arguably infringes the copyright owner's reproduction right, and
the transfer of the copy may infringe the copyright owner's distribution
right.o However, some exceptions to copyright owners' exclusive reproduc-
tion and distribution rights exist under copyright law and may prove critical
in resolving the "Digital Asset Dilemma," as it applies to digital purchases.
1. Fair Use
The fair use doctrine, as codified in section 107 of the Copyright Act,
serves as an affirmative defense to a copyright infringement claim.102 The
fair use doctrine balances a copyright owner's interest in the "production and
distribution of creative works" with the public's interest in accessing these
works and its constitutionally protected free speech rights.103 In order to
achieve this balance, the fair use doctrine allows the use and reproduction of
copyrighted works for limited purposes, such as critiques or parodies.104 The
doctrine allows these limited uses because they advance arts and sciences
without injuring the copyright holder.105 Section 107 of the Copyright Act
provides a non-exclusive list of factors to guide courts determining whether
the fair use doctrine should apply, as follows: (1) the purpose and character
of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
96. See Hinkes, supra note 16, at 688 (explaining a copyright holder's rights).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Barbour, supra note 13, at 168.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 169.
102. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
103. See Hinkes, supra note 16, at 697.
104. Id.
105. Barbour, supra note 13, at 172.
382 [Vol. XVI
Digital Music and E-book Libraries
nonprofit, educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3)
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for, or value of, the copyrighted work.106 Guided by these factors, and
others, courts must determine on a case-by-case basis whether a certain use is
"fair."107 Courts must soon decide whether the copy that occurs during the
transfer of digital purchases constitutes fair use. If courts determine digital
transfers satisfy the fair use doctrine, then individuals would no longer need
to worry about infringing a copyright owner's exclusive reproduction rights
2. Essential Step
Essential step is another affirmative defense to an infringement claim of
the copyright owner's exclusive reproduction right, codified in section 117 of
the Copyright Act. 08 Section 117 provides a safe-harbor to owners of author-
ized copies of computer programs who reproduce the program: (1) as an
"essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with
a machine [i.e., a computer] and . . . in no other manner"; or (2) for archival
purposes only, and the archived copies are destroyed upon termination of the
right to possess the computer program.109
The essential step defense further requires a seller to include the original
file with all of the seller's rights to it when making a sale. 0 If courts view
the making of a copy during the transfer of a digital file as an "essential
step," as defined in section 117 of the Copyright Act, the essential step de-
fense could serve to protect post-death transfers of digital purchases.]]i
3. First Sale Doctrine
Finally, the first sale doctrine bars infringement claims related to the
distribution right granted in copyright.112 "The first sale doctrine allows the
owner of a lawfully obtained copyrighted work to 'sell or otherwise dispose
of the possession of that copy' without the permission of the copyright
owner."'13 In other words, once the copyright owner puts the copyright work
on the market, subsequent owners may freely resell the work.
The first sale doctrine was created to balance the public's interest in the
enjoyment and exchange of information with the copyright owner's interest
106. 17 U.S.C. § 107; Barbour, supra note 13, at 172.
107. Barbour, supra note 13, at 172.
108. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2012).
109. Id. at § 117(a); Barbour, supra note 13, at 176.
110. Barbour, supra note 13, at 176.
111. See generally id. at 168.
112. Id. at 179.
113. Hinkes, supra note 16, at 688 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2008)).
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in protecting the copyrighted work.'14 The doctrine protects the public's in-
terest by limiting "a copyright owner's distribution right in that he can only
exploit the copyrighted work up to the point of the first sale," thus allowing
the purchaser of the copyrighted work to give it as a gift, lend it to a friend,
or devise it at death.'15
The United States Supreme Court upheld the principle of the first sale
doctrine in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, ruling a copyright owner could not
impose a mandatory price scheme on its copyrighted book, thereby restrict-
ing the work in the resale market."16 The copyright owner in Bobbs-Merrill
was a publisher who owned the rights to a book called The Castaway." t7 The
publisher printed the following statement in each copy of the book: "The
price of this book at retail is $1 net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less
price, and a sale at a less price will be treated as infringement of the copy-
right."118 Despite such notice, the defendant, a retailer who purchased copies
of the book from a wholesale distributer, began selling his copies for $0.89
per copy."l 9 The publisher sued the retailer for copyright infringement and
sought to "restrain the sale" of its copyright protected work.120 Shortly after
the Court's decision in favor of the retailer, Congress responded by codifying
the first sale doctrine in section 27 of the 1909 Copyright Act.121 Congress
has since recodified the doctrine in section 109 of the Copyright Act.122
While the first sale doctrine does much to protect the sharing and trans-
fer of copyrighted works, the doctrine is limited; it does not give the owner
of a copyrighted work the right to reproduce a work in its entirety.123 There-
fore, the first sale doctrine only protects the transfer of an original or "law-
fully made" copy.12 4 This limitation is particularly important with respect to
digital purchases because the transfer of digital purchases necessarily re-
quires the creation of digital copies.125 The fair use doctrine or essential step
defense could potentially solve this problem.126 However, due to the lack of
114. Id.
115. Id. at 688 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 109).
116. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1908); Hinkes, supra note
16, at 689.
117. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. at 341.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 342.
120. Id. at 341.
121. Hinkes, supra note 16, at 689.
122. 17 U.S.C. § 109; Hinkes, supra note 16, at 689.
123. Hinkes, supra note 16, at 689.
124. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
125. Barbour, supra note 13, at 168.
126. Hinkes, supra note 16, at 687-88.
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legal clarity regarding the applicability of these exceptions to the copy and
transfer of a digital purchase, planning for the transfer of digital purchases
upon death is further complicated by copyright law.
4. Digital Millennium Copyright Act
In 1998, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) amended the
Copyright Act, further regulating purchasers and copyrighted works.127 The
DMCA specifically prohibits individuals from circumventing any Digital
Rights Management (DRM) technology, which is used by companies such as
iTunes and Amazon to prevent purchasers from creating copies of copy-
righted material.128 This DMCA provision essentially creates another right
for copyright owners: the right to control access to the work.129 For instance,
through DRM technology, Apple can restrict customers from using DRM-
protected music on non-Apple products. 130 Additionally, "Apple's DRM pre-
vents direct dissemination of the purchased music from user to user, as well
as over the Internet."31 Congress's codification of such a provision to allow
and protect DRM technology contradicts the competing policies behind the
fair use doctrine, essential step defense, and first sale doctrine, all of which
seek to promote the public's interest in the use, enjoyment, and dissemination
of copyrighted works.132 The DMCA's support of DRM technology creates
an additional legal obstacle to transfer digital purchases at death.
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW REGARDING
DIGITAL PURCHASE TRANSFERS
A. Copyright Law
Recent attempts to reconcile current copyright law with technological
advances have proven challenging. This is primarily because copyright law
has traditionally focused on physical tangible property, rather than intangible
digital property. 133 Since parties transfer digital works without exchanging
any physical property, it is unclear whether digital purchases should be
treated like physical property.134 Because of the differences between digital
127. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-04 (2012); Hinkes, supra note 16, at 690 n.30.
128. 17 U.S.C. § 1201; Hinkes, supra note 16, at 693-94.
129. Hinkes, supra note 16, at 688-89.
130. Id. at 694.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 702 (stating that the Copyright Office has offered no legislative steps
to accommodate the first sale doctrine in the digital world).
133. Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of
Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1254-55 (2001); Barbour,
supra note 13, at 166.
134. Liu, supra note 133, at 1255; Barbour, supra note 13, at 168.
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music, e-books, and their physical counterparts, copyright law stands as a
major hurdle to the transfer of digital assets at death.
1. Right to Copy
One potentially major roadblock to the free transfer of digital purchases
is the inherent requirement of making copies to exchange digital files,
whereby "individual parts of this unauthorized copy ultimately recombine
indefinitely in the recipient device's random access memory (RAM), and the
original copy remains perfectly intact on the transmitter's computer, availa-
ble for use in further distribution."l35 This method of transferring digital data
disrupts the balance between the copyright owner, the public, and the con-
sumer because the act of copying digital files implicates the copyright
holder's exclusive right of reproduction.136 This raises the question of
whether the fair use doctrine or the essential step defense should apply to
copies of digital files made for the purpose of transferring files.'37
Growth in technology has already caused an expansion of the fair use
doctrine.138 For example, the advent of photocopying and videotape record-
ing expanded individuals' ability to reproduce copyrighted works and has,
therefore, complicated the actions constituting "fair use."l39 Such technologi-
cal advancements have led the Supreme Court to extend the fair use doctrine
to home recordings of television programs, as seen in Sony Corp. of America
v. Universal City Studios, Inc.140 In Sony, Universal sued the manufacturer of
a home video recorder for contributory infringement, claiming that the users
of the video recorder were making unauthorized copies of Universal's copy-
righted television programs.141 The Court, however, viewed the making of
such copies as a form of "time-shifting;"l42 i.e., viewers were making copies
of television programs to watch later.143 The Court further held this type of
"time-shifting" use is a personal noncommercial use.144 The Court also held
the four fair use factors must be examined to determine whether "time-shift-
ing" constituted infringement of the copyright owner's reproduction right.145
135. Barbour, supra note 13, at 168-69.
136. Liu, supra note 133, at 1254-55.
137. Barbour, supra note 13, at 168-69.
138. Id. at 172.
139. Id.
140. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-55
(1984); Barbour, supra note 13, at 173.
141. Sony, 464 U.S. at 420.
142. Id. at 421.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 418.
145. Id. at 448-51.
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"Time-shifting" is only one type of permissible conduct allowed under
the fair use doctrine. For example, in Recording Industry Ass'n of America v.
Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., the Ninth Circuit applied the fair use
doctrine to a concept known as "space-shifting."l46 In Diamond Multimedia,
the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) claimed that copying
MP3 files from a user's hard drive to transfer them directly onto the defen-
dant's MP3 player was an infringement of the copyright owner's reproduc-
tion right.147 The court ruled that the MP3 player merely allowed for "space-
shifting," and just as television viewers could "time-shift," "computer users
have the right to 'space shift.' "148 Therefore, the court made it possible for
users to make copies of their legally obtained copyrighted music in order to
listen to the MP3 files on devices other than their computers.149 Furthermore,
the court ruled that the fair use doctrine protected this type of use as a "para-
digmatic noncommercial personal use."150
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit declined to extend either the "time-shift-
ing" or "space-shifting" defenses to the defendant in A & M Records v. Nap-
ster, Inc. 51 In Napster, a record company sued Napster, a file sharing
website, for contributory copyright infringement and claimed that Napster's
peer-to-peer file sharing technology facilitated users in violating the copy-
right owners' reproduction right.152 Napster's file sharing services allowed
users to search for, access, and download MP3 files from other users' com-
puters.153 The court distinguished Napster's use of the copyrighted music
files from the permissible "shifting" allowed in Sony and Diamond Mul-
timedia because, the "shifting" allowed in those earlier cases only made the
copyrighted works available to the user themselves, as opposed to the general
public.154 For this reason, the court held the fair use doctrine did not protect
Napster's misuse of copyrighted digital files.155
The fair use doctrine could prove vital to the ability to transfer digital
purchases after death. So long as the post-death transfer of the digital files
sufficiently compares to "time-shifting" or "space-shifting," as seen in Sony
146. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d
1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999).
147. Id. at 1073.
148. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1079; Barbour, supra note 13, at 173.
149. Barbour, supra note 13, at 173.
150. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1079.
151. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001).
152. Id. at 1010-11.
153. Id. at 1011.
154. Id. at 1019.
155. Id.
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and Diamond Multimedia, then courts should uphold such transfers.156 While,
no court has ruled that fair use necessarily applies to the transfer of digital
purchases, such a decision would make the transfer of digital music and e-
books much more feasible under copyright law.157
In addition to the fair use doctrine, the essential step defense could fur-
ther legitimize the transfer of digital purchases between users.158 The essen-
tial step defense could apply in situations where an intermediate copy of a
music file is made when transferring ownership of the file from one user to
another. In such situations, the intermediate copy could be considered an
"essential step" for transferring and "utilizing the content of the file 'in con-
junction with a machine."159 Therefore, under this theory, the intermediate
copy would not be considered an infringing use.o60 If a court found this rea-
soning persuasive, the essential step defense could be the avenue through
which the transfer of digital media at death becomes legal under copyright
law. Unfortunately, no court has yet ruled that the essential step defense ap-
plies to digital music or e-books.161
2. Right to Distribute
The transfer of digital purchases faces a second issue in copyright law
regarding the legality of the actual transfer to the intended recipient.162 Copy-
right law reserves the right of distribution to the copyright owner; therefore, a
question exists as to whether the digital file transfer is a violation of that
right.163 The first sale doctrine protects the subsequent transfer of any origi-
nal or "lawfully made" copy, such as a hard copy of a book or a CD.164
However, because it is unclear whether copies of digital files are "lawfully
made," the doctrine may not apply.165 Therefore, the owner of a copyrighted
music or e-book file may not be protected by the first sale doctrine when
transferring such files to his heirs.
156. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 454-55 (holding that home time-shifting is fair use);
Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1079 (holding that the act of transferring an
MP3 file to an MP3 player is one type of permissible space-shifting allowed
under the fair use doctrine); Barbour, supra note 13, at 196.




161. See id. at 181.
162. Id. at 169.
163. Barbour, supra note 13, at 169.
164. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
165. Barbour, supra note 13, at 168.
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One particular incident, entitled the "Double Dutch Bus" incident, drew
comment from both proponents and opponents regarding application of the
first sale doctrine to digital purchases.166 George Hotelling listed a purchased
iTunes song on eBay entitled "Double Dutch Bus," but eBay claimed such an
act violated its "Downloadable Media Policy," which prohibited the "listing
of items or products to be delivered electronically through the Internet."67
Opponents of the first sale doctrine sided with eBay, claiming the doctrine
did not apply to digital purchases because the seller would be forced to copy
the protected song in order to transfer it to the buyer, thus violating the copy-
right owner's reproduction right.168 Opponents further argued the first sale
doctrine only applied to the original copy of a copyrighted work and was
never intended to apply to duplicate copies.169 Furthermore, opponents
claimed the rapid digitization of copyrighted works had increasingly pro-
moted "vibrant trade" at the expense of copyright owners' rights and inter-
ests.170 On the other hand, proponents of the first sale doctrine's applicability
to digital purchases argued the doctrine focuses "on the scope of the property
interest being transferred rather than 'the nature of the land or chattel that is
the object of the property interest.'"71 Accordingly, all rights pertaining to
physical property should be extended to digital property as well.
One of the guiding policies behind the first sale doctrine is its guaran-
teed access to published works through secondary market channels, which is
essential due to the fact that "copyright owners discontinue large numbers of
books and recordings each year."172 "[O]ne estimate suggested that 60% of
all sound recordings are out of print."l73 Further, the vice chairman of Barnes
& Noble reportedly claimed that, in 1999 alone, "90,000 books went out of
print."l74 Digitization of books makes their dissemination much more eco-
166. Hinkes, supra note 16, at 696.
167. Hinkes, supra note 16, at 696; George Hotelling, Does the Right of First Sale
Still Exist, 90% CRUD (Sept. 3, 2003, 12:20 AM), http://george.hotelling.net/
90percent/geekery/doestheright of first sale still-exist.php.
168. Hinkes, supra note 16, at 696.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 697 (quoting Reply Comments of the Library Associations Before the
Library of Congress, United States Copyright Office and Department of Com-
merce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration (Sept. 5,
2000), available at http://www.arl.org/info/fm/copy/letter)60500.html (re-
sponding to inquiry regarding Sections 109 and 117 Docket No. 000522150-
0150-01)).
172. Id. at 702.
173. Id.
174. Hinkes, supra note 16, at 702-203.
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nomically feasible than the printing of paper versions.175 Therefore, "a digital
market, much like the traditional secondary market, can ensure that even if
demand falls below a profitable amount for the owner to continue sales, the
public may still be able to access and derive benefit from the work."176
3. What Constitutes a "Copy"?
Legal scholars have debated whether a RAM copy of a digital file
should be considered a "copy" under the Copyright Act. 177 If a digital file is
not considered to be a "copy," then the first sale doctrine would likely protect
its transfer after death.178
The Ninth Circuit specifically addressed whether a copy stored in the
RAM of a computer constituted a "copy" under the Copyright Act in MAI
Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.179 In MAI, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
a third-party computer and software maintenance company violated the copy-
right owner's exclusive right of reproduction when the company copied a
computer program into another computer's RAM.180 The defendant, Peak,
argued its use of the program was necessary to its business, and in order to
diagnose and correct problems with MAI's software on the users' computers,
Peak would run a copy of the MAI software.181 MAI sued Peak, claiming
Peak had violated the terms of the software licensing agreement and in-
fringed upon MAI's reproduction rights by creating copies of MAI's
software.182 Peak argued that running the program-which was necessary in
order to diagnose and correct its clients' computer-related issues-did not
constitute making a copy, as contemplated by the Copyright Act.183 The Cop-
yright Act defines copies as "material objects, other than phonorecords, in
which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."84 A work is
"fixed" if the work "is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
175. Id. at 703.
176. Id. at 703.
177. Liu, supra note 133, at 1251.
178. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517-18 (9th Cir.
1993) (rejecting the defendant's argument that RAM copies of computer
software are not "fixed" and therefore not copies under the Copyright Act).
179. See MAI, 991 F.2d at 518 (ruling that a RAM copy of a computer program
constituted a copy under the Copyright Act).
180. Id. at 519.
181. Id. at 513.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 518.
184. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
transitory duration."185
Peak claimed the portions of MAI's software stored in clients' com-
puters' RAM were only there temporarily while each computer was turned
on and the program was running.186 Therefore, Peak argued that a "copy," as
defined by the Copyright Act, was not made because the software was stored
for a "transitory duration," and thus was not "fixed."187 The court disagreed
and ruled the copies made in a computer's RAM "were sufficiently 'fixed' to
constitute 'copies'" because the copies could be "perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated" via the computer.188
Peak further argued its actions were privileged as an "essential step"
under section 117 of the Copyright Act, which allows software owners to
reproduce software either as an "essential step in the utilization" or for "ar-
chival purposes."89 The court, however, ruled the essential step defense did
not apply to the facts of MAI because the software users were licensees and
not owners of the computer program.190
In 1998, Congress responded to the Ninth Circuit's decision in MAI by
adding the Computer and Maintenance or Repair Exemption to the DMCA;
this new codified exemption specifically allows third-party computer mainte-
nance companies to run software on multiple machines for purposes of re-
pairing computers.191 While this exemption legislatively overruled the issue
specifically addressed in MAI, Congress drafted the exemption so narrowly
as to suggest that all copies made in RAM for non-maintenance purposes
qualify as "copies" under the Copyright Act.19 2 Consequently, the MAI deci-
sion and Computer and Maintenance or Repair Copyright Exemption argua-
bly make the transfer of digital purchases even more problematic.193
4. Recent Attempts at Digital File Transfers
After MAI, multiple companies attempted to create resale markets for
digital media.194 One such company was Bopaboo, a Washington, D.C. based
company that put together an after-market resale store for digital
185. Id.
186. MAI, 991 F.2d at 518.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Liu, supra note 133, at 1257.
190. MAI, 991 F.2d at 518 n.5.
191. Liu, supra note 133, at 1261-62.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Barbour, supra note 13, at 169.
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purchases.195 Bopaboo provided an "e-Bay like marketplace for 'used' digital
music files."196 A seller could upload MP3 files to the store, and Bopaboo
would receive a certain percentage of the revenue.19 7 In order to prevent users
from uploading the same song multiple times, Bopaboo developed a program
that identified whether someone had altered specific music files.198 Unfortu-
nately, copyright infringement complaints prevented Bopaboo from suc-
ceeding.199 Bopaboo's service implicated copyright owners' reproduction and
distribution rights because, even after the sale, the original copy of the MP3
file remained on the seller's computer. 200
Recently, a company called ReDigi developed a different approach to
the digital resale market.201 ReDigi offers "cloud music storage in personal
lockers" and allows users to sell their eligible, pre-owned MP3 and MP3-
type files in an online marketplace.202 In order to participate in ReDigi's mar-
ketplace, users must download a copy of their Music Manager Software.203
The ReDigi software determines whether the user's music file is authentic
before allowing the file to be placed in the user's ReDigi cloud locker.204
ReDigi deems that a music file is authentic, and thus resalable, when the file
was legally purchased through the iTunes Music Store.205
Unsurprisingly, ReDigi claims its technology does not violate the copy-
right owner's reproduction right.206 To support this assertion, the company
avows the only time users make a digital copy of any song file when using
ReDigi's services is when uploading and downloading files to and from their
personal cloud lockers.207 ReDigi further asserts its use of digital files should
be protected as fair use because such copies are simply forms of "time-shift-
195. Id.
196. Id. (quoting Sam Diaz, Bopaboo May Feel Like eBay but Will End Up Looking






200. Barbour, supra note 13, at 169.




205. Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction at 19, Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., No. 12-CV-
0095 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2012), ECF No. 14.
206. Id. at 14.
207. Id. at 9.
392 [Vol. XVI
Digital Music and E-book Libraries
ing" or "space-shifting," and therefore only the user has access to these cop-
ies.208 ReDigi claims copies are not created when transferring these files from
one user's cloud locker to another user's cloud locker after purchase. 209 In
other words, users only transfer their original files. 210
Furthermore, ReDigi argues its business model does not infringe copy-
right owners' distribution rights. 2"l Interestingly, ReDigi argues distribution
rights do not apply to digital music files because they are not "material ob-
jects, copies, or phonorecords, within the meaning of [section 106(3) of the
Copyright Act]."212 ReDigi also argues, if digital music files are considered
"material objects, copies, or phonorecords" under section 106(3) (which de-
fines the parameters of the distribution right), then the files must be treated
similarly under section 109(a), "hence exempt anyway . . . under the first sale
doctrine."213 Moreover, ReDigi's Music Manager Software deletes all dupli-
cate music files on each seller's personal computer and cloud locker.214 Thus,
ReDigi's service seems to align well with the policies underlying the first
sale doctrine's intent to protect the interests of copyright owners.215
Though ReDigi seems to have developed a secondary market for digital
media without violating copyright law, the Recording Industry Association
of America (RIAA) and Capitol Records, LLC have not been impressed.216
RIAA sent ReDigi a cease-and-desist letter, and Capitol Records filed a cop-
yright infringement lawsuit against ReDigi in the Southern District of New
York.217 The result of the pending Capital Records lawsuit will greatly im-
pact individuals' ability to transfer digital purchases, as well as the applica-
bility of the fair use doctrine, essential step defense, or first sale doctrine to
the transfer of such files.2 18 Until the court reaches a decision, ReDigi contin-
208. Id. at 10, 12.
209. Id. at 14.
210. Id.
211. Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction at 15, Capitol Records, No. 12-CV-0095, ECF No. 14.
212. Id. at 16.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 20; Barbour, supra note 13, at 191.
215. Hinkes, supra note 16, at 688 (describing the policy behind the first sale
doctrine).
216. Barbour, supra note 13, at 171; Eriq Gardner, RJAA Attempts to Shut Down
Second-Hand Digital Music Store, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Nov. 15, 2011,
7:07 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/riaa-redigi-digital-mu
sic-261636.
217. Barbour, supra note 13, at 171; Gardner, supra note 216.
218. Barbour, supra note 13, at 170-71; Gardner, supra note 216.
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ues to run its second-hand store online. 219 The court has notably already de-
nied a Capitol Records motion for preliminary injunction in February
2012.220
There is also good reason to believe the federal government favors the
type of online market that ReDigi developed. Interestingly, the U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office recently granted Amazon a patent that covers a "secondary
market for digital objects," much like the one established by ReDigi.221
According to the text of the patent, which Amazon first applied for in
May 2009, digital objects not only include e-books, but also "audio, video,
computer applications, etc." that are purchased from an original vendor. The
patent goes on to say, "When the user no longer desires to retain the right to
access the now-used digital content, the user may move the used digital con-
tent to another user's personalized data store when permissible and the used
digital content is deleted from the originating user's personalized data
store."222
Companies like Amazon and ReDigi have clearly prepared technology
allowing the transfer of digital purchases at death to exist. However, it is not
yet clear whether courts will find these technologies to infringe copyright
laws. The ReDigi decision could move the law one step forward, or one step
back, to solving the "Digital Asset Dilemma" of digital music and e-books.
B. Contract Law
In addition to the issues posed by copyright law, contract law compli-
cates the rights individuals have to transfer digital property.223 Contract is-
sues may arise, for example, when users agree to a seller's "click-wrap"
contract at the time they purchase e-books or digital music downloads.224
Apple notably uses these types of contracts and requires that all iTunes users
agree to the terms contained in the iTunes Software Agreement before grant-
219. Press Release, ReDigi, ReDigi Wins Major Victory In Court Hearing Over Pre-
Owned Digital Music, Capitol Records (EMI) vs. ReDigi (Feb. 6, 2012), http://
newsroom.redigi.com/redigi-wins-major-victory-in-court-hearing-over-pre-
owned-digital-music-capitol-records-emi-vs-redigi/.
220. Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction, No. 12-CV-
00095 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2012), ECF No. 25.
221. U.S. Patent No. 8,364,595 (filed May 5, 2009) (issued Jan. 29, 2013); Eriq
Gardner, Amazon Gains Patent on Market for "Used" Digital Movies, Songs,
Books, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Feb. 2, 2013, 4:20 PM), http://www.holly
woodreporter.com/thr-esq/amazon-gains-patent-market-used-418909.
222. Gardner, supra note 221 (quoting '595 Patent).
223. Hinkes, supra note 16, at 690-691.
224. Id. at 690.
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ing access to iTunes225 The Amazon MP3 Store, eMusic, Nook, and Kindle
require similar agreements. 226
Terms and conditions in these agreements often prohibit the transfer of
digital purchases. For example, the terms and conditions may limit the num-
ber of times users can create copies of purchased files.227 Additionally, most
agreements reserve ownership of the copyrighted material and the right to
modify terms of the agreement at any time.228 For example, Amazon MP3
Store's Terms of Use expressly grants "a non-exclusive, non-transferable
right to use the Music content" and clearly indicates the purchaser does not
own the music downloaded from the store. 229 The contract terms further re-
strict a purchaser's rights by specifying the purchaser "may not redistribute,
transmit, assign, sell, broadcast, rent, share, lend, modify, adapt, edit, license
or otherwise transfer or use the Music Content."230 Similarly, eMusic's Sub-
scription Agreement severely restricts transferring purchased music by pro-
viding strict limitations, such as "all memberships are limited, revocable
licenses," "[User] will not allow another person to use [the users'] IDs . . .
under any circumstances," and "[User] have no right to provide any files
obtained through the Service to any other party or through any other
means."231 The iTunes Store Terms of Use places several limitations on a
user's permissible uses of digital content.232 The agreement explicitly states
the account holder is the only person who may access his or her account.233
Furthermore, the iTunes agreement limits the number of permissible copies
and devices used to access the file.234 However, the iTunes Terms and Condi-
tions do not expressly state a user's purchases are limited to a license to use
225. Id.
226. Amazon MP3 Store Terms of Use, supra note 49; Terms of Use, EMUSIC, http://
www.emusic.com/info/help/terms-of-use-us/ (last updated Feb. 7, 2013); Kin-
dle Terms of Use, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display
.html/ref=hp_1eft cn?ie=UTF8&nodeld=200506200 (last updated Sept. 6,
2012); Nook Terms of Service, BARNES & NOBLE, http://www.bamesandnoble
.com/u/Terms-of-Service-NOOK-Simple-Touchl379003279/ (last updated Feb.
13, 2012).
227. Amazon MP3 Store Terms of Use, supra note 49; Terms of Use, EMUSIC, supra
note 226; Kindle Terms of Use, supra note 226; Nook Terms of Service, supra
note 226.
228. Terms of Use, EMUSIC, supra note 226; Kindle Terms of Use, supra note 226;
Nook Terms of Service, supra note 226.
229. Amazon MP3 Store Terms of Use, supra note 49.
230. Id.
231. Terms of Use, EMUSIC, supra note 226.
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the iTunes files.235 Therefore, it has been argued iTunes actually intends to
transfer title and ownership of the music files it sells, despite the company's
restrictive terms of service.236
ReDigi's willingness to authenticate and resell only songs purchased
from iTunes lends further support to the theory that digital sales intend to sell
originals, rather than copies, of those files.237 iTunes notably partnered with
ReDigi to sell new music to ReDigi's members when used copies of a song
are unavailable.238 iTunes' readiness to partner with a company reselling its
product lends credibility to the argument that iTunes intends to transfer the
purchaser full title to music files. 23 9
Many agreements between e-book providers and users contain restric-
tions similar to those found in digital music contracts. For instance, Amazon
Kindle's Terms of Use agreement plainly states, "[c]ontent is licensed, not
sold, to [User] by the Content Provider," and "[User] may not sell, rent,
lease, distribute, broadcast, sublicense, or otherwise assign any rights to the
Kindle Content or any portion of it to any third party."240 Similarly, Barnes &
Noble's Terms of Service purports to grant "User a limited, nonexclusive,
revocable license to access . . . of the contents of the Barnes & Noble.com
Site, which includes the Digital Content."241 These licenses "do not include
any rights to . . . reproduce, copy, or resell the Barnes & Noble.com Site, the
Content or any portion or derivative thereof' nor the rights to "copy or
download any User's account or profile information for the benefit of any
third party."242 Clearly, the terms of these agreements, along with the use of
DRM technology, can make the legal transfer of valuable digital purchases
upon death complicated, if not impossible.
Indeed, case law exists to buttress the idea purchasers of digital media
subject to restrictive license agreements become licensees rather than own-
235. Barbour, supra.note 13, at 195.
236. Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction at 19, Capitol Records, No. 12-CV-0095, ECF No. 14.
237. Barbour, supra note 13, at 190.
238. Press Release, ReDigi, ReDigi Iaunches Artist Syndication Program and
iTunes Partnership for New and Pre-Owned Digital Music (June 12, 2012),
http://newsroom.redigi.com/redigi-launches-artist-syndication-program-and-
itunes-partnership-for-new-and-pre-owned-digital-music/.
239. See id. (announcing ReDigi's partnership with iTunes).
240. Kindle Store Terms of Use, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/cus-
tomer/display.html?nodeld=201014950 (last updated Sept. 6, 2012).
241. Barnes & Noble.com Terms and Conditions of Use, BARNES & NOBLE, http://
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ers. 24 3 In Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., the Ninth Circuit ruled a purchaser of
expensive software was not entitled to sell the software because he merely
held a license to use the software.244 Therefore, the first sale doctrine did not
apply to uphold the licensee's attempted sales.245 While the court made it
clear its decision applied specifically to computer software, the decision sup-
ports the idea that a purchaser of digital music or e-books is merely a licen-
see of such products rather than an owner.246 The court's willingness to
classify a purchaser of digital media as a licensee-or unwillingness to clas-
sify as an owner-could exacerbate the "Digital Assets Dilemma" regarding
digital purchases.
On the other hand, some legal scholars have argued restrictive agree-
ments, such as those required by Amazon and Barnes & Noble, may allow
for transfer upon death.247 One supporting argument suggests that when a
content provider does not specify the duration of the license, the license be-
longs to the licensee in perpetuity.248 A license owned in perpetuity is poten-
tially transferrable at the licensee's death.249 The district court in UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto (UMG I) expanded upon this theory further.250
In UMG I, a copyright owner brought suit for copyright infringement
against an individual who sold copies of the copyright owner's promotional
CDs through live auctions on eBay.251 The court, however, was not con-
vinced the defendant's actions constituted infringement.252 Specifically, the
court held a copyright owner's indication of a specific time period or return
date was a strong factor in favor of determining a license, rather than outright
ownership.253 According to the court, without the copyright owner's ex-
pressed intent to regain possession of the work the exchange should be con-
243. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1116 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding
that direct purchasers of software are licensees of the software, not owners);
Barbour, supra note 13, at 186.
244. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1116.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1111.
247. See Yu, supra note 94 (quoting Xuan-Thao Nguyen, intellectual property law
professor at SMU Dedman School of Law).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto (UMG 1), 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1061
(C.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that "the music industry insiders' ability to indefi-
nitely possess the Promo CDs is a strong incident of ownership through a gift
or sale."), aff'd, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011).
251. Id. at 1058.
252. Id. at 1065.
253. Id. at 1061.
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sidered a gift or sale, and the recipient should be considered the owner of the
copy.254
However, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit refused to adopt the district
court's proposed test.25 5 The Ninth Circuit merely affirmed the district
court's decision and limited its ruling to the particular facts of the case.2 5 6
The court specifically rejected the theory that return of possession is required
in order to create a license.257 Instead, the court considered other factors, such
as whether the copyright owner retained control over its copies and the recip-
ients of the copies assented to the creation of a license.258 The court found the
copyright holder in UMG retained "virtually no control" over its CDs and,
due to the means of distribution, the recipients of the CDs had not consented
to a licensing agreement. 259 Furthermore, since the court found the copyright
owner had transferred title of the CDs, the first sale doctrine applied and
permitted the defendant's subsequent sale of the CDs.260 The court notably
considered the copyright holder's requirement to return the CDs to be a non-
dispositive factor when determining the copyright holder's retained control
of the CDs.261 Since most agreements between consumers and digital content
providers do not stipulate for the subsequent return of purchased content, the
UMG decisions support the allowance of digital purchase transfers after the
purchaser's death.262 However, in many cases, DRM technology and copy-
right law may still prevent the transfer.263
Another critical problem with such restrictive terms of service is that
only 4% of users actually read any account terms beyond the product
description and price.264 Arguably, users do not read these contract terms
because they possess little bargaining power or they do not think anything
will ever go wrong. 265 Until users start refusing to accept such unfavorable
254. Id. at 1062.
255. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto (UMG II), 628 F.3d 1175, 1182-83 (9th Cir.
2011).
256. Id. at 1183.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1182.
259. Id. at 1183.
260. Id.
261. UMG II, 628 F.3d at 1183.
262. See id. (discussing unlimited possession in determining ownership of a CD).
263. Hinkes, supra note 16, at 690.
264. Tamey, supra note 33, at 778-79 (quoting Robert A. Hillman, Online Boiler-
plate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms Backfire?,
104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 842 (2006)).
265. Id. at 779.
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terms, it seems unlikely digital sales companies will face enough market
pressure to include transferability provisions in licensing agreements. 266
The lack of bargaining power between service providers and consumers
has led courts to find licensing agreements unconscionable and thus unen-
forceable.267 Courts find contracts to be unconscionable when a party can
"prove both that the contract terms unreasonably favor the other party and
that a 'gross inequality of bargaining power' exists that leaves the claiming
party with no meaningful choice as to the terms of the agreement."268 Uncon-
scionable terms are those "so extreme as to appear unconscionable according
to the mores and business practices used at the time."269 For example, in
Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., Mark Bragg sued the owners of the online
community Second Life for expelling him and taking his "virtual assets."270
The service agreement between Bragg and Second Life contained an arbitra-
tion clause, and Second Life moved to enforce the provision.271 Bragg
claimed the terms of the contract were unconscionable, and consequently in-
valid, because the terms "assumed too much power" and were "unreasonably
biased against the user."272 The court agreed with Bragg and found parts of
the service agreement's arbitration clause to be unconscionable.273 This deci-
sion indicates that future challenges to the enforceability of licensing agree-
ments could succeed.274 Bragg, therefore, further supports the transferability
of digital purchases after death.275
C. Property Law
Property law also poses many problems when attempting to find a legal
solution for transferring digital purchases after death.276 Under the Uniform
Probate Code (UPC), an appointed representative administers the assets of a
266. Id.
267. Kutler, supra note 51, at 1657-58.
268. Id. at 1658 (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445,
449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
269. Id.
270. Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 595 (E.D. Pa. 2007);
Kutler, supra note 51, at 1658.
271. Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 595.
272. Kutler, supra note 51, at 1658.
273. Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 608.
274. Kutler, supra note 51, at 1658.
275. Id.
276. 2 FREDERICK K. Hoops ET AL., FAMILY ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE§ 34:19 (4th
ed. 2012) (interpreting UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-715 (amended 2010)).
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decedent's estate. 277 "The range of powers granted to the personal representa-
tive is broad, with the authority of the probate court; these powers include the
authority to settle claims, perform under contracts, and transfer assets from
the estate to beneficiaries and third parties."278 However, an appointed repre-
sentative only has the authority to administer "assets."279 This limitation
poses two problems: (1) digital assets, such as e-books and downloaded mu-
sic may not legally be considered "assets," and (2) even if digital assets do
qualify as "assets," due to restrictive terms of service, decedents' rights to
such digital assets likely terminate at death.280
The first of these problems comes from a limited definition of property.
There are two categories of property: real property and personal property. 281
The definition of real property encompasses "land and anything that is at-
tached to it," while personal property is defined as "anything that is not real
property."282 Personal property is further divided into two sub-categories:
tangible personal property and intangible personal property. 283 Tangible
property is any "[p]roperty that has physical form and characteristics," and
intangible property is defined as "[p]roperty that lacks a physical exis-
tence." 284 Examples of tangible property include furniture, cars, books, and
appliances.285 Intangible property consists of things such as stocks, bonds,
patents, copyrights, and trademarks.286 The distinction between tangible and
intangible property is important because the probate process differs between
the two categories.287 Digital assets do not clearly fit the definition for either
tangible or intangible personal property. 288 Digital assets, such as digital mu-
sic and e-books, can change from intangible to tangible with a simple click of
the mouse. 289 Music and books in their traditional forms are treated as tangi-
277. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-715; see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-425 (regarding
the duties of a conservator appointed for an incapacitated individual); Hoops
ET AL., supra note 276.
278. Hoops ET AL supra note 276.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Conner, supra note 34, at 304.
282. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining "property"); Conner, supra
note 34, at 304.
283. BLACK's LAw DicTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining "property"); Conner, supra
note 34 at 304.
284. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining "property").
285. Id.; Conner, supra note 34 at 304.
286. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining "property").
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ble property; however, it is unclear whether such property should be treated
the same under probate law.290 This lack of clarity makes traditional probate
laws and devices (e.g., wills and trusts) insufficient for planning how to
transfer digital purchases after death.291
Courts have not offered guidance regarding the categorization of digital
purchases such as e-books and music downloads. Furthermore, courts seem
loath to extend full property rights to other types of digital assets.292 For
instance, in Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, the court refused to permit a trespass of
chattel tort claim against a plaintiff who sent improper electronic messages
and failed to recognize computer servers as real property. 293 Similarly, the
Legislature has not codified any laws regarding probating digital purchases,
though many state legislatures have addressed the need to transfer other types
of digital assets upon death.294 This leaves individuals and estate planners
guessing how to plan for the transfer of their valuable digital assets after
death.295
IV. ANALYSIS
A conglomeration of copyright, contract, and property law govern the
permissibility and method of legally transferring digital purchases. Scholars
therefore look to each of the three bodies of law in search of solutions. How-
ever, even if problems posed under one body of law are resolved, other issues
generally still exist which restrict the at-death transfer of valuable digital
purchases.
A. Copyright Law
Some commentators proffer the first sale doctrine should apply to digi-
tal purchases in the same way the doctrine applies to other copyrighted
works.296 Such application would allow for a digital resale market, like the
one developed by ReDigi, and further allow for free transfer of digital
purchases after death. However, if copyrighted e-books and digital music
downloads were freely transferable after purchase, some technology is neces-
sary to guarantee the original purchaser would not possess the original copy
after transfer. If this type of transfer is not made available, the user is likely
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Kutler, supra note 51, at 1664.
293. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 1358 (2003); Kutler, supra note 51, at
1664.
294. Baldino, supra note 26, at 30.
295. See Yu, supra note 94 (describing the confusion in this unsettled area of law).
296. Hinkes, supra note 16, at 696.
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infringing the copyright owner's distribution right.297 Such infringement
would upset the balance between the public's interest in free dissemination of
information and a copyright owner's interest in creating and protecting origi-
nal work.298 This was not contemplated by the legislature when codifying the
first sale doctrine.299 However, the policy underlying first sale doctrine is as
important now as when first codified, and should be interpreted more func-
tionally when considering digital assets. Changes in technology have not
changed the public's interest in the enjoyment and dissemination of copy-
righted works. Therefore, the first sale doctrine should extend rights to digital
media like those to tangible property, including the right to transfer digital
purchases after death. If new technologies make it feasible for individuals to
transfer original files, there is no convincing reason to prevent purchasers'
heirs from later enjoying the digital purchases themselves.
One major problem is the first sale doctrine exclusive application to
"lawfully made" copies.300 Therefore, the intermediate copies made during
the transfer of digital files must be protected under copyright law before first
sale doctrine can protect such a transfer. Specifically, as argued in ReDigi,
the making of RAM copies in the process of uploading digital files into cloud
storage should be considered the same type of "space-shifting" allowed in
Diamond Multimedia. As argued in Diamond Multimedia, users of MP3 stor-
age simply shift the digital files from one storage medium to another. This
use is no different than using an iPod, external hard drive, or other cloud
storage services. Moreover, construing the use of cloud storage in the transfer
of digital files as "space-shifting" protects society's interest in the use and
enjoyment of copyrighted works. This is precisely the policy justifying the
fair use doctrine. Consumers of digital books and music should be allowed to
use and store digital property through any medium, so long as such use does
not harm the copyright owner. Cloud storage does not implicate any such
harm. Cloud storage is also becoming increasingly popular and important for
consumers' daily lives.301 Any court's decision to apply copyright law re-
stricting cloud storage services would thus have "drastic and far reaching"
consequences for the many users who rely on cloud storage services every
day.302 A reasonable interpretation of the fair use doctrine would suggest the
creation of intermediate copies made during the use of cloud storage consti-
297. Barbour, supra note 13, at 168-69.
298. Hinkes, supra note 16, at 689.
299. Id.
300. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
301. Colleen Miller, Gartner: Consumers Will Drive Huge Growth for Cloud Stor-
age, DATA CENTER KNOWLEDGE (July 2, 2012), http://www.datacenterknowl-
edge.com/archives/2012/07/02/gartner-consumers-will-store-more-in-the-
cloud/.
302. Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction at 12, Capitol Records, No. 12-CV-0095, ECF No. 14.
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tutes fair use. The first sale doctrine should thus protect the subsequent trans-
fer of those files.
DRM technology and restrictive licensing agreements also present ob-
stacles to the legal transfer of digital files. DRM technology presents chal-
lenging opportunities for companies like ReDigi that facilitate the resale of
digital assets. Moreover, Congress indicated the desire to allow copyright
holders to control access to protected works by including DRM protection in
the DMCA.303 If this were truly Congress's intent, allowing the first sale
doctrine to apply to digital purchases would create inconsistency within cop-
yright law. Even with the possibility of creating such inconsistency, not ad-
dressing the policy behind the first sale doctrine is counterproductive. The
public has great interest in the use and enjoyment of copyrighted works and,
because these works are increasingly available in digital form, copyright law
should recognize and protect this interest.
Additionally, as ReDigi argued in defense of its digital resale market,
digital resale markets for authentic MP3 files actually increase the value of
the MP3s by providing them with resale value.304 Such digital resale markets
would further help prevent piracy by decreasing the value of inauthentic cop-
ies.305 ReDigi only allows the resale of files the ReDigi software can authen-
ticate.306 ReDigi's refusal to sell pirated music incentivizes the purchase of
music through venerable sources such as iTunes, as opposed to less credible
sources offering pirated copies. Moreover, by decreasing the value of pirated
copies, this technology protects the copyright owner's exclusive reproduction
right. Users are much less likely to make copies of protected works if such
copies are of little value in the market. The use of technology, such as that
offered by ReDigi (and similarly patented by Amazon) has great implications
for the legal transfer of digital purchases at death. This could be the perfect
answer to protecting an individual's right to bequeath personal property
while still protecting copyright owners' interests.
B. Property Law and Digital Estate Planning Solutions
Some legal scholars suggest the answer to the "Digital Asset Dilemma"
is to treat digital assets like tangible personal property and allow individuals
to bequeath them through wills and trusts. 307 The user arguably owns some
303. Hinkes, supra note 16, at 691.
304. Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction at 20, Capitol Records, No. 12-CV-0095, ECF No. 14.
305. Hinkes, supra note 16, at 719.
306. Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction at 19-20, Capitol Records, No. 12-CV-0095, ECF No
14.
307. See Kutler, supra note 51, at 1649 (proposing a property based approach to
devising digital assets).
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digital assets such as e-mails, blog posts, and social media profiles.308 Treat-
ing these assets as tangible property under probate law theoretically provides
a great solution to facilitate transference after death. However, it is not clear
digital assets are actually owned by purchasers, and it is likely the license to
use these downloads expires at death. Consequently, legal access to such
assets also seems to expire at death, thus leaving nothing to bequeath by will.
Users will probably continue to avoid copyright and licensing laws by simply
leaving account information and instructions to heirs for accessing the ac-
count information outside of probate.309 Even still, such access may violate
licensing agreements.
Entrepreneurs are continuously creating new services that will allow in-
dividuals to leave passwords and account information to their heirs. While
these services give heirs access to a decedent's accounts, they do not guaran-
tee the heirs will ever actually obtain legal ownership. In respect to digital
music and e-books, these services are also of little practical value. For in-
stance, leaving a username and password only allows a designated person to
open and access an iTunes or Kindle account. Such a transfer does not pro-
vide for the division of valuable assets between heirs; there are certainly
critical limits on what heirs may do with digital purchases after transferred.
Certain conveniences and features are also lost after heirs receive transfers of
decedent's digital property. For instance, an heir will be unable to create
playlists or shuffle the music left by the decedent. Furthermore, many de-
vices only allow access one account at a time, again limiting the usability of
transferred digital purchase by the heir.
Moreover, the complications of using wills, trusts, or DEP technology
are numerous. These types of transfer mediums would require frequent up-
dating, and wills and trusts must comply with the formalities required by
state law.310 This presents a problem for people who presently have accounts
they would like to bequeath. Comprehensive, uniform legislation is needed to
make wills, trusts, or DEP technology useful for transferring digital
purchases at death. If statutes allowed beneficiaries to access a decedent's
digital music or e-book libraries, then a person designated in a will, trust, or
DEP service could access the accounts and transfer the original copies
through the use of cloud technology in accordance with the decedent's
wishes. Such wishes (along with usernames and password) could also be
conveyed through a DEP service, a trust, or through separate document indi-
cated a will. While each of these means of conveyance present problems of
identity theft, privacy concerns, and other complications, they may be the
most practical solutions to the "Digital Assets Dilemma."
308. See generally Darrow & Ferrera, supra note 28 (regarding ownership of e-
mails).
309. Beyer & Cahn, supra note 38, at 41.
310. Conner, supra note 34, at 320.
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C. Contract Law
As the law stands, copyright and property law offer no viable solution to
transferring digital purchases at death. Contract law, however, may provide
the most readily available answers. Providers of digital content should be
required to specify ownership of the copy is transferred at purchase, or, alter-
natively, the license to the copyrighted work belongs to the purchaser in
perpetuity. It would be immensely helpful if providers such as iTunes re-
quired users to designate a beneficiary when creating an account; then, if the
user wanted to be more specific in dividing the digital libraries, other benefi-
ciaries, or instructions for the division of the digital assets, could be placed in
a will, trust, or even in a note with a DEP service. Along with a provision
transferring ownership to the purchaser and an option for designating a bene-
ficiary, providers should offer a convenient way to transfer such works to the
designated beneficiary's account upon death of the user. After such transfer,
the decedent's account should be deleted. This solution would align with
copyright and property law. By deleting the decedent's account after provid-
ing for the transfer of assets to the designated accounts, the provider would
be protecting the interests contemplated by the first sale doctrine. Both the
copyright owner's reproduction interest and public's use and enjoyment in-
terest would be preserved. Moreover, the intent of the decedent and right to
devise property after death would be protected.
Furthermore, some online retailers already allow users to make more
copies of digital purchases than copyright law would otherwise permit.311
Therefore, even without the use of technology like ReDigi, it would not be
inconsistent with some contracts to provide for the copy and post-death trans-
fer of digital music or e-books. Since companies such as iTunes already al-
low users to make a certain number of copies for personal use, it is likely
those companies would not oppose legatees similarly enjoying those same
digital purchases.
D. Uniform Legislation
Digital content providers such as iTunes and Amazon will likely avoid
any changes to their licensing agreements until legislatures force their hands.
Even with the availability of technology, such as that used by ReDigi, the
transfer of digital purchases may still violate the terms of service between
users and service providers. Moreover, property and copyright law will likely
continue to impede users' transfer of digital music and e-books at death, even
if market pressure forces content providers to change terms of service. For
these reasons, it is imperative legislators start developing laws to permit and
direct the transfer of digital assets upon death or incapacity. Toward this end,
"[o]n July 8, 2011 [The Uniform Law Commission (ULC)] received a propo-
sal that would provide fiduciaries with authority to access online accounts
311. See iTunes Store Terms and Conditions, supra note 49 (granting users the right
to make up to five copies of iTunes files).
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and digital property during incapacity and after death."312 The ULC devel-
oped the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), which notably "keeps state law up-
to-date by addressing important and timely legal issues."313 A primary goal
of the UPC is to "align state inheritance law closer to public expectations, as
reflected by recent important changes in family and living patterns."314
Therefore, the ULC's experience in drafting the UPC makes the ULC an
ideal vehicle for guiding state legislatures in developing laws geared toward
protecting digital assets after death.315 The 2011 ULC proposal stressed un-
certainty in this area of probate law and the need for uniform legislation
regarding the right to transfer digital property at death.316 While the ULC's
proposal ultimately did not pass, the ULC succeeded in a related effort to
form a more permanent Study Committee to further investigate similar pro-
bate issues in the future.317
This Study Committee would be wise to consider the particular
problems troubling the transfer of digital purchases. The Committee should
also look to recent advances in technology. Specifically, any future law re-
garding digital assets should explicitly classify digital purchases, such as e-
books and digital music, as "assets" in order to facilitate the disposition of
individuals' digital estates. Furthermore, a uniform law should allow for ac-
cess to the decedent's account by a designated or appointed individual for the
sole purpose of distributing the digital assets to the designated beneficiary or
family member. Additionally, the statute should require the deletion of all
copies of the digital asset in existence in the decedent's account or on the
decedent's computer. The provision requiring the deletion of the original
copies would be difficult to enforce. Therefore, legislation should include a
provision requiring the content provider to delete the user's account after
assets have been transferred. Also, drafters of such legislation should con-
sider the legality of technology, such as that offered by ReDigi, when trans-
ferring the assets and should mandate its use in the transfer to ensure any
additional copies of the asset are removed. Such a statute would bring the
law up to date with recent technological advances, protect the rights of copy-
right owners, and the right of individuals to transfer property at death.
312. Tarney, supra note 33, at 798.
313. Id. at 797 (quoting About the ULC, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://uniform
laws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=About%20the%20ULC (last visited Oct. 13,
2013)).
314. Id. at 797-98 (quoting Probate Code Summary, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Probate%20Code (last
visited Oct. 13, 2013)).
315. Id. at 798.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 798-99.
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While awaiting the critical, comprehensive, uniform legislation, con-
sumers should pressure service providers, such as iTunes and Amazon, to
provide agreements and technology that would allow for the free transfer of
digital music and e-books. This pressure could include reverting back to tan-
gible copies of books and music to prompt content providers to reexamine
terms of service. Moreover, until the right to transfer digital assets at death
statutorily available, consumers should take practical measures to ensure ac-
cess to their digital assets are preserved. The most practical of options would
be to use a DEP service to provide a trusted beneficiary necessary usernames,
passwords, and instructions for all accounts housing important digital infor-
mation and assets.
The right to decide property disbursement at and after death is engrained
in American jurisprudence.318 In fact, this right is "one of the most powerful
rights granted to citizens of the United States."319 Property is changing, but
the "powerful" right to "dictate the disposition" of property should not be
forsaken simply because technology has advanced beyond the law's contem-
plation.320 Moreover, a licensing agreement should not trump the right to
devise property, and the rights of copyright owners should not be protected
above the right of an individual to devise his own property at death. For these
reasons, uniform legislation must be passed requiring service providers to
allow for the transfer of assets upon death.
As more attention is brought to the "Digital Asset Dilemma," and as
more people begin to die leaving valuable digital music and e-books behind,
I am hopeful that when I am no longer around to enjoy my favorite songs and
most precious books my children will be able to enjoy them in my place. I
know at least one person wants the same thing . . . . Thank you Bruce Willis
(and tabloid writers following you) for calling attention to an area of law
needing reform.
318. Tarney, supra note 33, at 795.
319. Id. at 773-74 n.8 (quoting Justin Atwater, Who Owns E-Mail? Do You Have
the Right to Decide the Disposition of Your Private Digital Life?, 2006 UTAH
L. REV. 397, 397 (2006)).
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